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It is sometimes  asserted  that rational speculative  activity must result 
in  more  stable  prices  because  speculators  buy when  prices  are low 
and sell when they are high.  This is incorrect.  Speculators  buy when 
the chances of price appreciation  are high,  selling when the chances 
are low.  Speculative  activity in an economy  in which  all agents  are 
rational, have identical  priors, and  have access to identical  informa- 
tion  may destabilize  prices,  under  any  reasonable  definition  of  de- 
stabilization.  It  takes  extremely  strong  conditions  to  ensure  that 
speculative  activity  (of  the  commodity  storage  variety)  "stabilizes" 
prices, even  in a very weak sense. 
I.  Introduction 
Do speculators  stabilize prices? This old question  has been the subject 
of  a  large  literature,  going  back  as  far  as  Smith  (1789/1937)  and 
including  Mill  (1921),  Friedman  (1953),  Baumol  (1957),  Telser 
(1959),  Farrell (1966),  and  Samuelson  (1971),  among  others.  (For a 
comprehensive  bibliography,  see  Goss and  Yamey  [1978].)  The  case 
that speculators  must stabilize prices is succinctly put in the adage that 
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(rational) speculators  "buy cheap  and  sell dear," thereby  raising low 
prices and  lowering  high  prices.  To  quote  from  Friedman  (1953,  p. 
175),  'People  who  argue  that  speculation  is generally  destabilizing 
seldom  realize that this is largely equivalent  to saying that speculators 
lose  money,  since  speculation  can  be destabilizing  in general  only  if 
speculators  on the average  sell when  the currency  is low in price and 
buy when  it is high."  Thus  it seems  that only  irrational  speculators 
could  destabilize  prices. 
In  fact,  matters  are  more  complicated  than  this,  as a number  of 
authors have noted.  This is because there is less to the "buy cheap and 
sell dear" adage  than  meets  the  eye.  Speculators  will buy  when  the 
chances  of  price  appreciation  are  high,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
when  prices are low (see Kohn  1978). This observation  in fact under- 
lies a number  of examples  of profitable, destabilizing  speculation  that 
were  developed  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  (see  Baumol  1957;  Telser 
1959;  Farrell  1966).  These  examples  are  not  conclusive,  however, 
since  they  rely either  on  there  being  a small number  of  imperfectly 
competitive  speculators  or on nonspeculators  having irrational expec- 
tations. The  purpose  of the present  paper is to show that speculation 
can be destabilizing  even  when  speculators  are competitive  and both 
speculators  and  nonspeculators  have rational expectations. 
Any theory  of  speculative  behavior  must address  the thorny  ques- 
tion  of  how  to define  speculation.  Despite  the  many attempts  to do 
this in the literature,  a satisfactory  general  definition  is still not avail- 
able (and probably never  will be; see,  e.g., Johnson  [1976]).  We shall 
not  attempt  to  give  one  here.  Rather  we  will study  a  very  specific 
situation  in which  there  is a fairly natural and  (we hope)  noncontro- 
versial  notion  of  speculation  and  speculators.  We will also make  no 
attempt to give a general  definition  of price destabilization.  The  cases 
we will study  are sufficiently  specific  that the terms stabilization and 
destabilization  have simple  and  intuitive  meanings. 
Our  basic  model  concerns  the  market  for  a  commodity  such  as 
wheat (although  we will show  that the model  can also be interpreted 
as one for a durable asset). The  market meets at a sequence  of discrete 
dates.  There  are two types of  agents.  One  type, nonspeculators  or con- 
sumers,  trades in the market only for purposes  of immediate  consump- 
tion. The  second  type, speculators,  buys with the intention  of  holding 
the commodity  and then selling at a higher  price at a later date. (Thus 
in our model "speculation" is synonymous  with "storage.") Exogenous 
uncertainty  in the model  comes  from the fact that the nonspeculative 
demand  schedule  at each  date  is random,  drawn  according  to some 
probability distribution.  (This  distribution  may depend  on  the  posi- 
tion of  demand  in the  previous  period.)  Speculators  are assumed  to 
know  this probability  distribution  and  to have  rational  expectations PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  929 
about the resulting  stochastic  evolution  of  prices. Speculators  are as- 
sumed  to know the current  position  of the demand  for consumption 
schedule,  and  they  may  possibly  possess  some  further  information 
concerning  future  levels  of  this schedule.  The  inferences  they  draw 
from  this information  are always correct  in the  Bayesian  sense,  and 
they  all have  access to the  same  information.  Consumers  also know 
these  things,  but  that  they  do  so  is  unimportant:  They  enter  the 
market only  once,  buying  only  for  immediate  consumption.  (Models 
along these lines may be found  in a number of papers; see, e.g.,  Kohn 
[1978]  and Scheinkman  and  Shechtman  [1983].) 
Our  objective  is to show  that  such  storage/speculation  can  lead  to 
less stable equilibrium  prices. The  basic example  of this runs roughly 
as follows. Suppose  that the sequence  of consumption  demand  sched- 
ules  is independent  and  identically  distributed  but  that  at any  date 
there  may be portents  about  next  period's  schedule.  Specifically,  as- 
sume that demand  in each period  is either very high or very low, that 
the  chance  of  high  demand  is quite  small,  and  that whenever  next 
period's demand  will be high,  there  is in this period  a signal that this 
will happen.  Suppose,  however,  that  this  signal  is imperfect  in  the 
sense  that,  while  it always appears  prior  to  high-demand  periods,  it 
also sometimes  appears  prior to low-demand  periods.  It does  the latter 
sufficiently  infrequently  that the chance  of high demand  next period 
conditional  on having observed  the sign is greater than the (marginal) 
probability of  high  demand  but also sufficiently  frequently  that it is 
wrong more times than not. (Numbers  will be given in the body of the 
paper.) Now suppose  that in the current period consumption  demand 
is low and the signal is present.  Speculators  may then buy up some of 
the supplies of the commodity,  anticipating  the chance of a high price 
next  period.  If  the  signal  turns  out  to be  accurate  so that the  high 
price does  occur,  then  this is price stabilizing in the sense  that prices 
are higher  this  period  and  lower  next.  But  suppose  the  signal  this 
period  is inaccurate and moreover  that there is no signal next period. 
Then  next  period  speculators  will dump  their  stored  supplies  onto 
the  consumption  market  without  providing  any  further  demand. 
(The fact that the signal is absent means that high prices cannot occur 
in the next  period,  and  so in this period  there  is no speculative  mo- 
tive.) This  might  well depress  prices next period  to a level lower than 
they would ever get without  the presence  of speculators.  Now it is by 
no means clear that this leads to less stable prices in any precise sense, 
but (by playing  with elasticities  of  demand  for consumption)  we will 
be able to flesh out this example  and to show that destabilization  may 
indeed  occur. 
The  existence  of a noisy signal is not crucial to the construction  of 
lessened  stability from  speculation.  Destabilizing  speculation  can oc- 930  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
cur even if speculators  have perfect  foresight  about the future as long 
as this foresight  is limited,  in particular,  if speculators  at date t know 
(perfectly) the position of consumption  demand  at dates t, t +  1, . ..  t 
+  k, but  nothing  more.  But  while  one  can  always construct  an  ex- 
ample  in which  speculation  is destabilizing  for  such  an information 
structure  for any finite k >  0, in the extreme  cases k = 0  and k =  oo, 
speculation  will always be stabilizing (in a very weak sense).  And for a 
given  economy  (with everything  held  fixed  except  the  size of  k) this 
will be true for  large values  of k. 
The  thrust  of  this  paper  is that speculative  activity can destabilize 
prices (in reasonable  circumstances)-not  that it will. It should also be 
noted  that whether  or not speculation  stabilizes prices is in some sense 
the wrong  question.  One  really ought  to be interested  in the welfare 
implications  of speculation.  One  may feel intuitively that price stabili- 
zation is "good," but, if so, one's  intuition  is faulty (see Newbery  and 
Stiglitz  1984).  We  study  the  impact  of  speculation  on  price  stability 
rather  than  on  welfare  because  in  our  model  the  welfare  effects  of 
speculation  turn out to be complicated.  The  reader  should,  however, 
bear  in  mind  throughout  that  welfare  and  price  stabilization  can 
sometimes  be related  in a surprising  fashion.  We will indicate  this in 
the context  of our basic example  and then comment  on it generally in 
the final section. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  In Section  II, we give our  "ca- 
nonical"  example  of  price  destabilizing  speculation.  In  Sections  III 
and IV, we present  a more general  model and analyze the characteris- 
tics of equilibrium.  (Technical  details are left for the App.)  Section  V 
presents  the  limited  results  that we have  obtained  concerning  when 
speculation  might be said to be price stabilizing. We sum up in Section 
VI. 
II.  An Example  of  Destabilizing  Speculation 
We first present  a very simple  example  to show how speculation  can 
be destabilizing  (under  any reasonable  definition  of stability). We be- 
gin by giving a brief description  of the economy  we shall be consider- 
ing. Imagine  a market for a storable commodity.  This market meets at 
a sequence  of dates t =  ..,,  -10  ,1  2  ....  Supply to this market is 
inelastic; we will explain  the sources  of this supply shortly. There  are 
two types of demand:  demand  for consumption  purposes  and demand 
for storage  or speculative purposes. 
Consumption  demand  derives  from consumers  who are in the mar- 
ket just  once.  That  is, a new  generation  of consumers  enters  at each 
date t and then  exits  forever.  We suppose  that consumption  demand 
in  period  t depends  on  the  equilibrium  price  of  the  commodity,  pt' PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  931 
and  on  a random  taste  parameter,  0.  That  is, the  consumption  de- 
mand  schedule  shifts  in or out  from  period  to  period,  with 0, a de- 
scription of the position of the schedule  at date t. We write D(pt; Ot)  for 
this demand  schedule. 
The  second  source of demand  is speculative  or storage demand  (we 
use the two terms interchangeably).  We suppose  that there  are over- 
lapping  generations  of competitive  speculators,  each speculator  living 
for just  two periods.  Speculators,  who  consume  only  the  numeraire 
commodity,  enter the market when young  with a fixed endowment  of 
the numeraire  good,  some  of which they spend  on the storable com- 
modity. They  then  store this commodity  for one  period,  possibly sub- 
ject  to some  wastage,  and supply  inelastically what comes  out of stor- 
age  to  the  market  when  they  are  old.  There  is  also  a  constant 
exogenous  inelastic supply  (fresh crop) each period,  which we denote 
by X.  Speculators'  storage  decisions  depend  on  the  current  price, 
Pt, and on their expectations'about  next period's price. These  expecta- 
tions will be rational. 
All speculators  (at date t) observe the current consumption  demand 
parameter,  Ot. There  may  also  be  additional  public  information  kt 
concerning  future  demand.  For example,  kt might  be Ot, 1: the con- 
sumption  demand  parameter  is known  one  period  in advance.  More 
generally,  kt might  represent  noisy information  about O +  s,  + 2,.  *  * - 
We  can  now  describe  our  example  of  destabilizing  speculation. 
Imagine  that in each  period  Ot is either  0 or 0. The  sequence  {0t} is 
an independently  and identically distributed  (i.i.d.) sequence,  with the 
probability that Ot  =  0 equal to .0 1. Consumption  demand  when  Ot = 
0 is perfectly  elastic at a price of  $1,000.  When  Ot =  0, consumption 
demand  is a bit more  complex:  From zero to  100 units, it is perfectly 
elastic at price $10.00.  Then  the demand  curve slopes downward:  It is 
at price $9.00  at 130 units, and it decreases  thereafter,  asymptoting  at 
price $8.00. 
In each period  100 fresh units of the commodity  are provided  (i.e., 
X  =  100). Speculators  can store up to 50 units, getting  back three for 
every  five stored.  Speculators  maximize  the  expected  present  worth 
of  income,  with  a  zero  interest  rate.  Their  endowment  of  the 
numeraire  is  assumed  to  be- large:  they  can  afford  to  purchase  50 
units even  if the  price is $1,000. 
The  key to this example  is the information  flow. At date t, besides  Ot 
there is available a signal kt that is an imperfect  portent  of the future. 
Specifically,  kt is either _ or k. Whenever 0,  I will equal 0, then kt =  k; 
t  indicates  the  impossibility  of  0 next  time.  But  at  =  k indicates  only 
that 0 is possible. When O+t I =  0, then at  =  k with probability  1/1  1 and 
at  =  g  with  probability  10/  1. Computation  with  Bayes's rule  shows 
that when at  =  k the chance that 0,  + I will be 0 is .1. In terms of our 932  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
TABLE  1 
TRANSITION  MATRIX  FOR  THE  MARKOV  CHAIN 
ok  .9  .1  0  0 
0i  .881  .09  .09  .01 
_k  .9  .1  0  0 
ok  .81  .09  .09  .01 
NOTE-Entries  are P(ost  I =  columnl4we = row). 
formulation,  {(06, (,)}  is a four-state  Markov chain, with transition ma- 
trix given  in table  1. 
The  idea  of  this  example  is that,  very  occasionally,  there  is huge 
demand  for the commodity  (6,  = 0). Such huge  demand  next  period 
is  foreshadowed  this  period  by  1.  But  seeing  e  indicates  only  the 
possibility  of  huge  demand  next  period-there  remains  substantial 
(.9) probability that demand  will be small. 
What will be equilibrium  price behavior  in this economy?  First con- 
sider what would  happen  if there  are no speculators  in this economy 
at  all.  Then  prices  will  be  $1,000  whenever  6,  =  6  and  $10.00 
whenever 6, =  0. 
Now  add  the  speculation/storage  activity. Speculators  will buy the 
commodity,  up to their limit of 50 units, whenever  0, =  6 and (,  =  E. 
Doing  so does  not  raise the current  price above $10.00,  and there  is 
some prospect  (a .1 chance)  that they will be able to sell next period at 
$1,000,  more  than enough,  given  their storage  technology  and deci- 
sion criterion,  to justify  the gamble.  When Ot =  0,  speculators  will not 
buy: There  are no prospects  for price appreciation.  And when 6, =  0 
and  (t  =  k,  speculators  will not  buy: The  current  price  is no  lower 
than  $8.00,  and  next  period's  price  can  be  no  higher  than  $10.00, 
which yields an insufficient  return  on  the investment. 
Price behavior  with speculators,  then,  goes  as follows. Whenever  6, 
0,  the  equilibrium  price  is  $1,000,  just  as  in  the  case  with  no 
speculators.  And  when  Ot =  0,  there  are two possibilities:  If k, =  E 
then  speculators  will take  50  units  off  the  market.  This  will ensure 
that supply  for consumption  is not more than 80 units, and the equi- 
librium price will be $10.00.  If (,  =  _  and it was the case that Its  I =  (, 
then  supply  for  consumption  is  100 (speculators  bought  neither  last 
period  nor  this),  and  again  equilibrium  price  is  $10.00.  The  one 
change  from  the  economy  without  speculators  (in terms  of  equilib- 
rium prices) comes  when  6, =  06,  i  f,  6  was 6, and  a- I WAS  E. In 
this case, speculators  do not buy this period,  but they  did  buy last period. 
Supply  for  consumption  is  130  units,  and  the  equilibrium  price  is 
$9.00. PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  933 
In other words, without  speculation,  price is sometimes  $1,000  and 
sometimes  $10.00  (much  more  often  the  latter).  With  speculation, 
price is $1,000  whenever  it was before.  But in those  cases in which it 
used  to be $10.00,  it is sometimes  $10.00  and sometimes  $9.00.  (It is 
$9.00  about  8 percent  of  the  time.)  The  additional  variability comes 
when  speculators  buy in one  period  in the  hope  of a huge  price rise 
and then, disappointed  in the next period,  dump their holdings.  Note 
that only  very rarely will their storage  decision  look sensible  ex post. 
But  it is perfectly  rational  ex  ante  because,  if it is 4"right," it gives  a 
huge  rate of  return. 
The  reader  will doubtless  note  the extent  to which we have cooked 
this example.  We wished  to present  as stark an example  as possible of 
price destabilization  (and one  that will be an example  of  destabiliza- 
tion under  any reasonable  notion  of  that term).  Perfectly elastic con- 
sumption  demand  and  a  sharp  cutoff  (at  50  units)  of  the  storage 
capabilities of speculators  were the keys. Relaxing these would muddy 
the  waters  considerably:  Storage  activities  would  help  depress  the 
very high  prices if demand  were  less than  perfectly  elastic at 0. And 
either  competition  among  speculators  or  reduced  supplies  for  con- 
sumption  (or both) would raise prices when speculators are withdraw- 
ing supplies  for purposes  of storage.  We do not mean to suggest  that 
speculation  must  destabilize  prices.  But  this  example  clearly  shows 
that, in a model  that plays by all the rules of rationality and competi- 
tive agents,  speculation  may have  this effect. 
Moreover,  we contend  that  this example  may well capture  salient 
aspects of reality. Think  of the  Ot process not as an i.i.d. sequence  but 
as a process that very occasionally  flips from one state to the other. We 
have  in mind  some  very  rare but very  significant  sea change  in the 
structure  of  the  economy:  war, famine,  or a very  radical change  in 
climate  or  technology.  Such  sea  changes  are  often  heralded  in  the 
press as being imminent.  In fact, the heralds appear much more often 
than the changes,  followed  by heralds  of  some  different  and  radical 
change.  That  is, these  premonitions  of change  are wrong  more often 
than not, but they do indicate  that one  is in a period  in which the sea 
change,  very unlikely  (in the short run) in any case, is relatively more 
likely. This  increase  in the  likelihood  of  the change,  especially  if the 
change  is massive, may be enough  to cause speculators  to enter what- 
ever markets are appropriate.  Then,  as is almost always the case, the 
premonitions  turn out  to have been  wrong,  the danger  recedes,  and 
speculators  dump  their holdings,  depressing  prices. Especially where 
the change  is of  the  extremely  rare and extremely  catastrophic  vari- 
ety, one  might  observe  a large  number  of  episodes  of  price  fluctua- 
tions and no observable  (ex  post) reason  for these  fluctuations. 
This  is simply a recasting  of the so-called  peso  problem,  studied  by 934  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Krasker (1980),  in which the peso forward rate fluctuated  in anticipa- 
tion of a devaluation  that did not come.  It provides  a possible expla- 
nation  for the  recent  empirical  work on  the  volatility of  share  prices 
(e.g.,  Shiller  1981a).  The  empirical  finding  is that share  prices  fluc- 
tuate  too  much  given  the  observed  fluctuations  in  the  net  present 
value of dividends.  If some changes  in dividends  are of the extremely 
large and rare variety, however,  one  may require  many years of data 
for these  to show  up. These  changes,  although  rarely observed  (per- 
haps  not  yet  observed  at  all),  may  still  cause  fluctuations  in  share 
prices,  given  the  sorts of  imperfect  portents  that we have  in mind.' 
In the rest of  the paper,  we shall investigate  in greater depth  what 
drives  the  example  above.  To  put  it another  way, we shall consider 
conditions  that are sufficient  to rule out the destabilizing  speculation 
of  this  example.  These  conditions  will  turn  out  to  be  surprisingly 
strong. 
We will do everything  possible to avoid discussing  the welfare impli- 
cations  of  speculation,  and  this simple  example  is useful  for  saying 
why this is. In this example,  the speculators  are risk-neutral expected 
consumption  maximizers.  Because  of  the constraint  that they face in 
their storage  capacity, even  though  they are competitive,  they extract 
positive surplus from being allowed to engage  in speculation.  And the 
consumers  are better off for the presence  of the speculators,  at least if 
one  uses  the  expected  consumer  surplus  measure.  So even  though 
prices  are  less  stable,  welfare  of  the  consumers  and  speculators  is 
Pareto-improved. 
However,  some  party  is supplying  those  fresh  100 units  each  pe- 
riod,  and  they,  it might  be  supposed,  are  worse  off  for  sometimes 
getting  $9.00  for their output  when  previously  they got $10.00.  If we 
think  of  the  supply  as  coming  in  the  form  of  endowment  to  the 
speculators,  then  with  the  storage  constraint  we  have  imposed  they 
are still better off  (ex ante) if they are allowed  to speculate.  But if the 
100  units  come  from  some  third  sector  of,  say,  consumers  of  the 
numeraire  good  and if members  of this third sector are extraordinar- 
' This would be one sort of small sample bias. Others are discussed  in Kleidon (1986). 
Also,  it should  be noted  that Shiller  himself  (1981b,  p. 300)  considers  and  rejects this 
explanation  of  his  empirical  findings.  We  do  not  wish  to  enter  into  any  empirical 
controversy,  but we cannot  help  noting  that if we interpret  0,  =  0 as Shiller's disaster 
and  the  time  period  as  1 year, then  our  numbers  work out  as follows.  There  is a .01 
chance of a disaster in any year, the chance  of observing  no disasters in a period of  108 
years is approximately  .34, and the chance  of observing  exactly one  disaster is around 
.37.  Moreover,  the  standard  deviation  in the  probability that a disaster will occur  next 
period  is approximately  .03. This  is not the .05 that is needed  to explain  Shiller's data, 
but then  we have not tried to find the  model  that maximizes  the standard deviation  in 
the  probability of  an incipient  disaster  subject to keeping  the average  probability of a 
disaster low. In any event,  this explanation  is not so easy to dismiss as Shiller seems  to 
contend. PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  935 
ily risk averse  concerning  their  level  of  consumption,  then  we  can 
juggle  the ex ante probabilities of being a consumer,  a speculator,  or a 
member  of  this  third  sector  so  that  speculation  leads  to an ex  ante 
Pareto decline  in welfare.  We repeat  from  the  Introduction:  Welfare 
considerations  are difficult,  and they may bear no particular relation- 
ship to the stability or instability of  prices. 
III.  A General  Model 
The  basic structure  of  the economy  in our  example  is kept through- 
out:  There  are  one-period  consumers,  whose  demand  is  given  by 
the  schedule  D(p,;  0,)  and  there  are  overlapping  generations  of 
speculators.  We begin  with two regularity  assumptions  about the de- 
mand schedules  of  the consumers. 
ASSUMPTION  1.  The  possible  values  of  0,  (the  possible  demand 
schedules)  are finite in number,  coming  from a finite set 0.  Within 0 
are a "least" and  a "greatest" 0,  written  0 and 0, such that 
D(p; 0)  5 D(p; 0) s  D(p; 0)  for all p and 0 C 0. 
ASSUMPTION  2.  For each  0, D(p; 0) is strictly positive  and continu- 
ously  differentiable  in p,  with  strictly  negative  derivative  (for p be- 
tween zero and infinity). Also, D(O; 0) =  oX  and limp,.  D(p; 0) =  0; the 
usual  Inada conditions  hold. 
Note  that, by virtue of assumption  2, if we let P(x; 0) be the inverse 
demand  function,  then P has all the properties  enumerated  for D in 
assumption  2. Note  also that assumption  2 is violated  in the example 
of Section  II; however,  examples  "close" to the one given there can be 
constructed  that satisfy assumption  2 and that exhibit the same behav- 
ior, although  price  when  0,  =  6 will have  to fall a bit from  $1,000. 
Speculative  demand  at date  t depends  on  the current  price pt and 
the distribution  of  next  period's  price, which we write Fa,+  1. This  de- 
mand schedule  is denoted  by D'(p,; Ft,+  1). The  following  assumptions 
are made. 
ASSUMPTION  3. For fixed Ft+ 1, D'(p,; Ft,  1) is continuous  and nonin- 
creasing  in pt. 
ASSUMPTION  4.  For fixed  pt, D'(pt;  Ft+ 1)  is continuous  and  nonde- 
creasing  in Ft+ 1.2 
ASSUMPTION  5. If pt exceeds  the largest value in the support of Ft+ I? 
then D'(pt; Ft+1)  =  0. 
2 Since F1,I  is a distribution,  this assumption  needs  clarification. The  schedule  D' is 
continuous  in F,, 1 in  the  sense  that,  if {F`; n  =  1, 2,  . . .} have  uniformly  bounded 
supports and approach  F in the weak topology,  then D'(p, F") -*  D'(p; F) for all p. And 
D' is nondecreasing  in Ft,+  1 if D'(p; F')  ?  D'(p; F) for all p whenever  F' is (first-order) 
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In other  words,  no  one  will speculate  if it is certain  that they  will 
lose  money  by doing  so. 
AssUMPTION  6.  Limp,  D'(pt; Ft+ 1) =  0, uniformly  in F,+ 1. 
That  is, speculative  demand  falls to zero as pt gets large, regardless 
of  the promises  of  speculative  profits. 
ASSUMPTION  7. For every X >  1, pt, and Ft+ 1, D'(pt; Fat 1) 2  D'(Xpt; 
XF,  1), where XFt+ I means the distribution F,+  "  "inflated" by X. That 
is,  XFt  I(q)  =  Fat  I(q/X). 
Of our assumptions,  these last two are the least palatable. (They are 
made so that, subsequently,  we can obtain uniqueness  of equilibrium.) 
One  way to view assumption  7 is to  note  that, by inflating  both  the 
current  price, pt, and  the distribution  of  next  period's  price, Ft+ 1, by 
the  factor  X, we  do  not  change  the  distribution  of  rates  of  return 
derived  from  speculation.  If speculators  base their  demand  only  on 
the  rates  of  return  from  speculation,  their  demand  will  be  un- 
changed.  Indeed,  one  might  expect  speculative  demand  to  fall,  in- 
sofar as the same rates of return prevail, but at higher  stakes. (And, to 
satisfy assumption  6,  for  large  enough  X we  will have  to  have  strict 
inequality.) 
The  simplest  story  underpinning  D'  is that  each  speculator  pos- 
sesses a storage  technology  of the following  sort: Storage of y units at 
date t yieldsf(y)  units recovered  at date t +  1. Imagine  that f(0)  =  0, 
f(y)  c  y for ally, andf  is nondecreasing,  nonnegative,  strictly concave, 
and bounded  above. Speculators  are risk neutral with a zero discount 
rate in the sense  that they attempt  to maximize  the expected  revenue 
accrued from sellingf(y)  units at price pt +  I less the cost pty  of purchas- 
ing the y units for storage.  Thus  each speculator  will wish to store that 
quantity  y* that satisfies  f'(y)  =  pgE(p?  1)'  where pt+  1 represents the 
random  variable of  next  period's  price  (the  distribution  of  which  is 
given  by Ft,  1), and  E(*) denotes  expectation.  Of  course,  y* is con- 
strained  below  to  be  nonnegative  and  above  by w/pt,  where  w is the 
speculator's  wealth  in the  numeraire  good,  assumed  to be finite and 
exogenously  given.  Then  D'  is just  the  number  of  firms  times  the 
optimal  (constrained)  y*. The  reader  can  easily check  that assump- 
tions 3-7  all hold: assumption  5 because we assume thatf(y)  <  y andf 
is  strictly concave,  assumption  6  because  of  the  finite  wealth  con- 
straint, and assumption  7 because only rates of return matter until the 
constraints  bind,  and  the constraints  go in the  right direction. 
Many variations on this simple story can be played, but care must be 
taken if the assumptions  are to remain.  One  can allow speculators  to 
borrow in the numeraire  in order to finance their purchases as long as 
there is some limit on credit.  (Otherwise,  assumption  6 is in jeopardy. 
Such  a credit  limit arises  from  general  equilibrium  considerations  if 
there  is a finite  amount  of  wealth  in  the  economy  at each  date.)  A PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  937 
positive discount  rate or risk aversion  could  be added.  But in adding 
risk aversion, one  must be careful  to preserve  the nondecreasing  part 
of  assumption  4.  (If,  for  example,  speculators  had  a target level  for 
proceeds  from  sales,  then  raising F,+ 1 could  lower  the amount  they 
need  to store to make  that target.) 
Speculators  base  their  storage  decisions  at date  t on  the  publicly 
available information  (0,, c,),  which  we write  4,,  where  k, represents 
any information  that they  might  possess  concerning  future  demand 
(beyond  what is in  0,). We assume  that all speculators  concur  in the 
following  (objective) assessment. 
ASSUMPTION  8. The  sequence  {4,;  t  =  .  .  .,-1,  0, 1, . . .  forms  a 
time-homogeneous  Markov chain  with finite  state space (.3 
Note  that the 4, may be serially correlated.  This  can occur even  if 
the 0, are uncorrelated  or independent  because  of  the additional  in- 
formation  t,  For example,  if i,  =  Ot+ , then 4t  =  (0,, 0t+ I) and 4t,  = 
(0,+I,  0,+2)  are dependent. 
All that remains  is to specify  the supply  side of  the economy.  Sup- 
plies in period  t, denoted  X,  are inelastic and depend  on the amount 
stored  in the  previous  period.  That  is, 
Xt +,  =  G(D'(pt;  Ft+  1))  (1) 
for a given  function  G. For example,  in our  simple  storage  story, 
G(D'(pt,;  Ft+1))  =  X  +  nf  )  n  ) 
where  X is exogenous  supply  each  period,  and  n is the  number  of 
speculators.  The  following  general  assumption  is made. 
ASSUMPTION  9.  The  function  G is nondecreasing  and  continuous, 
and it satisfies G(O)  >  0 and limG(y)  < oo. Also, G(y) -  G(O)  c y for y 
0. 
The  last part simply  says that storage  is nonproductive.' 
In summary,  our  market  model  is determined  by equation  (1) and 
the supply  equals  demand  equation, 
Xt  =  D(pt;  Ot) +  D'(pt;  Ft+ 1).  (2) 
These  are subject to assumptions  1-9  above. 
L  Time  homogeneity  simply  means  that  transition  probabilities  from  one  state  to 
another  do  not depend  on  calendar  time. 
4 We  note  again  that,  since  supply  is  inelastic  and  demand  is independent  of  the 
amount  brought  forward, we are thinking  of a consumption  sector distinct from storers 
and  from  overlapping  generations  of  speculators  who  consume  only  the  numeraire. 
Random  exogenous  supply  is easily accommodated  by shifting  any randomness  to the 
demand  side, i.e., by absorbing  it in D. Randomness  in the storage  technology  can also 
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Before  giving  a  formal  definition  of  equilibrium,  let  us  briefly 
sketch a second  interpretation  of our model  involving  durable goods. 
Think  of  a market  for  houses  in a given  locality.  In this locality is a 
fixed stock Y of houses,  subject to no depreciation.  At date t some part 
of  this stock,  say  ,, is held  by owner-occupiers  (consumers).  A ran- 
domly  selected  fraction  a  of  these  consumers  are compelled  by cir- 
cumstances  (death,  a job  somewhere  else)  to  sell  their  houses-the 
stock that they own (odY,)  is inelastically supplied  to the market. These 
departing  consumers  are replaced  by an equal  number  of  new con- 
sumers  (new families,  people  taking jobs in the area) so that the num- 
ber of consumers  is constant.  (This  is not a one-house-per-consumer 
society;  per  capita  holdings  of  the  asset  will change  through  time. 
Think of it this way: Some of the consumers  own houses,  while others, 
finding  the price of housing  too high on arrival, decide  to rent accom- 
modation.)  Newly arrived consumers  demand  houses in a fashion that 
depends  on the current  price pt and a random  taste parameter  O; this 
gives us D. Also, there are speculators  who buy the houses one  period 
and  sell  them  the  next.  Imagine  that  these  speculators  live  for  two 
periods  only,  so  their  supply  (at the  end  of  their  lives)  is inelastic. 
Their demand  (at the beginning  of their lives) depends  on the current 
price  and  the  distribution  of  next  period's  price;  this  gives  us  D'. 
Equation  (2)  is  immediate.  As  for  (1),  since  consumers  hold  what 
speculators  do  not, 
Xt  I =  G(D'(pt; Ft+1))  =  D'(pt; Ft+1)  +  t[Y  -D'(pt  Ft+ ) 
In this interpretation,  we assume  that owner-occupiers  do  not  enter 
the housing  market  except  when  they first arrive and when  they de- 
part;  they  do  not  adjust  their  holdings  in  the  intervening  periods. 
Also, they are, on arrival, sensitive  only to current  price; they ignore 
the  possible  capital gains  in deciding  how  much  to demand.  We are 
able to make  some  excuses  for  these  assumptions:  Transaction  costs 
for owner-occupiers  are too high  to make retrading  profitable.  Capi- 
tal markets  are  imperfect  so  that utility  from  capital  gains  is nearly 
inconsequential,  or  utility  from  capital  gains  is logarithmic  (so  that 
while  capital  gains  do  affect  utility  levels,  demand  is insensitive  to 
future  prices).  The  fact  that  such  imperfections  must  now  be  as- 
sumed,  however,  means that this interpretation  of the model  is not as 
clean as the  interpretation  involving  a commodity. 
IV.  Equilibrium 
Fix the data of a model as in Section  III. Let X  =  limbo  G(y) and X 
G(O)  (i.e., supplies  in any period lie somewhere  between X and X). The 
equilibrium  price pt will be a function  of current  information  4! and PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  939 
current  supplies  X,. We will look for time-homogeneous  equilibria: p, 
does  not  depend  on  the  particular  value  of  t.  Hence,  we  look  for 
prices given by some  function  p from 4? X [X, X] into [0, oc). Imagine 
that some  such  function  p is advanced  as a candidate  for an equilib- 
rium. When the current state of information  is 4)  =  (0, () and supplies 
are X  E  [X, X], consumption  demand  (at the  supposed  equilibrium 
price) will be D(p(4), X); 0). Storage in equilibrium  will therefore  be the 
residual of supply,  or X  -  D(p(4), X); 0). This  means that supply next 
period  will be  G(X  -  D(p(4), X);  0)). Thus  the  distribution  of  next 
period's  price  (still assuming  that  the  function  p  gives  equilibrium 
prices) will be the  distribution  of 
P(4 + I  G(X -  D(p(4), X); 0)))  given 4) =) 
where  it+  is random.  Let us write 
F(4), G(X  -  D(p(4), X); 0)), p) 
for  this distribution  function.  Note  how  the  three  arguments  enter: 
t+I  is distributed  according  to the  Markov transition  probabilities, 
given  4), =  4);  the  second  argument  gives  the  supplies  brought  for- 
ward into  next  period;  and p gives  the  (supposed)  equilibrium  price 
functional. 
The  equilibrium  condition  is that speculative  demand  does  indeed 
absorb the  residual  of  supply  less consumption  demand.  This  yields 
the  following  formal  definition. 
DEFINITION.  An equilibrium  is a function p: 4P x  [X, X]  [0, oc) such 
that for every 4)  =  (0, I) and X E  [X, X], 
D(p(4), X); 0)  +  D'(p(40,  X); F(io, G(X  -  D(p((4, X); 8)), p))  =  X.  (3) 
Note  that  this  is  a  rational  expectations  equilibrium  in  which 
speculators  act competitively.  That  is, the speculators  correctly antici- 
pate next  period's equilibrium  prices, and they take as given the total 
amount  that will be stored  this period. 
PROPOSITION  1. Under  our assumptions,  there exists a unique equi- 
librium price function,  which we denote  p*. This  function  is continu- 
ous and strictly decreasing  in its second  argument.  (Price is lower the 
greater is supply.)  In this equilibrium,  x  -  D(p*(4), x); 0) is increasing 
in x. (The more that is stored in one  period,  the more will be stored in 
the next,  ceteris  paribus.) 
The  proof  of proposition  1 is left to the Appendix.  But some  short 
technical  points  about  the  proof  that  have  economic  relevance  are 
worth  making.  Our  method  of  proof  is  somewhat  different  from 
those  that  have  appeared  in  the  literature.  As  in  Kohn  (1978),  we 
essentially  compute  the  equilibrium  by  successively  computing 
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will exist for only one  period  more,  then  two, and so on.  In the limit, 
we get the  equilibrium.  Kohn  (1978)  gets  convergence  by a contrac- 
tion  mapping  argument;  this  requires  strong  assumptions  on  elas- 
ticities. We avoid those assumptions  by invoking assumption  4: specu- 
lative demand  is nondecreasing  in next period's prices. This allows us 
to use monotone  mappings  (instead of contraction  mappings);  prices 
computed  for an economy  in which there are n +  1 more generations 
of  speculators  are always at least as high  as in an economy  in which 
there are n more  generations,  with the level of current  supplies  held 
fixed.5 Because  we use  iterated  mappings,  it is (in principle)  possible 
to compute  equilibria. Also, much of the literature assumes that the Ot 
are i.i.d. and no further  information  is available; we are able to avoid 
this entirely.  Typically,  it is difficult  to prove uniqueness  in models  of 
speculation  because  of  the  existence  of  Ponzi  schemes.  We  have 
avoided  such schemes  in two steps.  First, assumption  6 rules out the 
possibility that equilibrium  prices will become  unbounded.  And  then 
assumptions  4  and  5  combine  to  rule  out  bounded  Ponzi  schemes: 
speculative  demand  must be nearly zero when prices are close to their 
maximum  attainable  value. 
Indeed,  we can calculate that maximum  price. Let p be the solution 
of D(p; 6)  =  X. That  is, fi is the  price that prevails if supply  is X (the 
lowest possible level),  the consumption  demand  is at its highest  possi- 
ble level,  and  there  is no  speculative  demand. 
PROPOSITION  2. p  p, and  for all g, p*((O, A), X)  =  P. 
Since we are more  interested  in examples  than in general  proper- 
ties of  the  equilibrium,  we will desist  from  further  general  develop- 
ment.  But it is perhaps  worth  noting  that standard  results  from  the 
theory  of  Markov chains  will (with mild  regularity  conditions  on  G) 
ensure  that the chain {(Ot,  Xt); t =  0,  1, . . .} will settle down  to a long- 
run  stationary  distribution  if  we  assume  that  the  chain  {0tj  is  well 
behaved  (i.e.,  is aperiodic  and  irreducible). 
V.  Cases  of  (Weakly)  Stabilizing  Speculation 
Were  there  no  speculators,  the  evolution  of  the  economy  would  be 
simple.  Supplies  at each date would be X =  G(O),  and the equilibrium 
price would  be a function  of  O,  the  solution  to D(p; Ot) =  X. Let us 
denote  this solution  by pc(0t)  or, for 4t  =  (0,, ct),  p'(Pt).  Note  that p is 
simply p'(0).  We said above  that  price  functions  rise the  longer  (it is 
' The  force  of  assumption  4 should  not  be underestimated.  If speculative  demand 
arises from  expected  utility maximization,  then  it need  not be nondecreasing  in next 
period's  prices;  compare  the  comments  concerning  risk aversion  following  assump- 
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supposed)  that speculators  are around.  The  prices p/ correspond  to an 
economy  in which  there  will be no  speculators  in the  future.  Hence 
one  might conclude  that speculators  only raise prices. But, of course, 
this is wrong.  The  monotonicity  result holds  for a fixed  level of cur- 
rent supplies.  When  we add  speculators,  the distribution  of supplies 
changes:  speculators  shift supplies;  in periods  in which they increase 
X,, they may drive down prices. Indeed,  we know already (proposition 
2) that p* c  fi6 
We are interested  in comparing  p* with pC.  We saw in Section II that 
there  exist  nonpathological  economies  for which p* is more  variable 
than  pc  under  any  reasonable  notion  of  variability.  One  particular 
property  of the example  is that the lowest price in the support  of p* is 
lower  than  the  lowest  price  in  the  support  of  p'.  We  now  present 
sufficient  conditions  for pa not to be more variable than pc in this very 
grossest of senses.  That  is, we provide  conditions  for the lowest price 
in the presence  of speculators  to be greater than or equal to the lowest 
price in their absence.  By virtue of proposition  2, this implies that the 
range of prices does  not grow with the addition  of speculators.  In this 
case, we say that speculation  is weakly  stabilizing, with maximal possible 
emphasis  on  "weakly." 
One case in which speculation  is weakly stabilizing is the following. 
Suppose  that 4t =  Ot  and that the Ot  are i.i.d. That  is, at date t agents 
know nothing  that improves  on their ex ante prediction  of Ot,+  1. Then 
given any level of X,  the distribution  of next  period's prices is almost 
independent  of  the  current  price,  and  speculative  demand  will  be 
larger the lower is the current  price. Note  well the qualifier "almost"; 
for  fixed  X, a  larger  speculative  demand  this  period  means  lower 
prices next  (through  the  effect  on X,  1). The  point  is that the 4'buy- 
cheap-sell-dear"  adage  (which  gives  us  hope  for  price  stabilization) 
does  hold  at the  equilibrium. 
LEMMA.  In the special case 4t  =  Ot  and {0,} an i.i.d. sequence,  if p*(0, 
X) >  p*(0', X), then  D(p*(O,  X); 0)  ?  D(p*(0', X); 0'). 
We have stated the results in terms of D instead of D'. The  reverse 
inequality  holds  for  D'.  Suppose  we  strengthened  assumption  1 so 
that the possible values of 0 were real numbers,  and higher  0 meant a 
consumption-demand  curve  that  was  shifted  up  and  to  the  right. 
Then  this lemma could  be paraphrased:  Those  consumers  who value 
6  It is easy to show that, with speculators,  prices arbitrarily close to p will be observed 
infinitely often,  regardless  of the initial conditions,  as long as e  is visited infinitely often 
(is positively recurrent  from every other state) and transition from 0 to 0 in a single step 
has positive probability. (This will be true in all our examples.)  This is because, however 
large  are initial stocks, if there  are sufficiently  many high-demand  states in a row (an 
event  that will occur eventually),  these stocks will be exhausted  and prices will rise to p. 
(In this regard,  note  our  assumption  that the level of  stocks is bounded  above.) 942  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
the good  more highly get more of it. This  paraphrase  is precise: Since 
Xt is a function  of Xo and  {0t-k;  k ?  1}, Xt is independent  of  0,. 
To  show  this, suppose  the  converse  held.  Then  supplies  next  pe- 
riod  would  be  higher  under  0 than  0',  implying  that  next  period's 
price will be lower  under  0. Thus,  since p*(0,  X) >  p*(0',  X), specula- 
tive demand  is lower  under  0, which  is a contradiction. 
Does  the  fact that the  adage  holds  mean  that speculators  stabilize 
prices weakly? Proposition  3 says that the answer  is yes. 
PROPOSITION  3. In the special case 4, =  0, and {0j  i.i.d., if we begin 
with XO =  X, then  p*(0t,  Xt) ?  pC(0)  for all t with probability one. 
To  prove  this,  note  three  facts  already  shown.  (a) In  this  special 
case, p*(0, x) ?  p*(0, x) for all x. This  follows  from  the lemma.  (b) In 
this case, D(p*(0, x); 0) ?  D(p*(0, x); 0). This  is (virtually) the lemma. 
(c) The  function  x  -  D(p*(0, x); 0) is increasing  in x. This  is part of 
proposition  1. 
Now let 00, 0 1,...  Ot- 1  be any sequence of 0's and let Xt(0O.*,  ot-  1) 
be defined  iteratively by X0  = X and X,+ I(00, *  .  0 ) =  G(X(Oo,  ..  , 
OS-  1) -  D(p*(0s, X5(00,  ...  I  , 0-  1));  OS)).  That is, X, gives the value (in 
equilibrium)  of  supplies  at date  t as a function  of  past states of  de- 
mand, where X0 =  X. We claim that, for all (Oo,  .  .  ,Ot-  1),  Xt(0O.  .. 
0t - 1)  c  Xt(0, ..  , 0) (where in the right-hand  side there are t 0's). This 
follows inductively  from facts b and c. Suppose  that X5(0,  . .  Os  0  ) ? 
)(_  ...  , 0). Then 
Xs(0*  *  *  0  1)  -  D(p*(0 ,  XV(0>,  ...  , O -  0));  Os) 
c  X:  (,  ..  .  ,  0)  -  D(p*(0s,  Xs(0,  *  *, 0));  0s) 
by fact c 
c  X(0,  .*  ,  0)  -  D(p*(0,  Xs(0  .  * *,  0));  0) 
by fact b. Since G is nondecreasing,  we obtain Xs+  ,  I(00,  Os)  C  X,  1(0, 
,  .  0), completing  the  induction  step.  Thus 




p*(0,  Xt(0,  .  .  .,  0)). 
(The last step uses fact a.) Thus  the lowest possible price at date t is the 
one  at which every  Os =  0. 
And,  finally, if we start at X0 =  X, then X1(0) ?  X0. Applying  fact c 
inductively  shows that X(0,  .. .  , 0)  ?  Xt  1(0,  .  ,0).  Thus  along  the 
sequence  0H =  0, 0 1 =  0  ...  , if we start at Xo = X, then prices contin- 
ually decline.  But  they  can  never  decline  below  pc(O),  since  at each 
stage speculative  demand  is at least as large as at the stage before,  and 
so G(D )  -  D',+ 1  G(D )  -  D  ?  G(O). Thus  price is such that con- 
sumption  demand  is  no  more  than  G(O); that  is,  price  is no  lower 
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Is there any stronger  criterion  by which one  might judge  the stabil- 
ity of prices? One  possibility is to look at the stationary distribution  of 
prices,  using  summary  statistics such  as the  variance of  the  distribu- 
tion  or  criteria  of  riskiness  such  as those  in  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz 
(1970)  or Diamond  and Stiglitz (1974).  But consider:  Suppose  that in 
one  regime  we have  price  equal  to $100  for  1,000  periods  in a row, 
followed  by 1,000  periods  at $200,  then  1,000  at $100,  and so forth, 
while in a second  regime  the  price is either  $101  or $199,  each with 
probability one-half,  independent  of  previous  prices.  By criteria ap- 
plied  to the distribution  of  prices,  the former  regime  is "less stable," 
yet this does  not necessarily  accord with our intuition.  So perhaps  we 
should  look  at the  stationary  distribution  of  price  changes  (in either 
absolute  or  relative  terms):  we could  consider  the  variance  of  price 
changes  or apply  Diamond-Stiglitz  or Rothschild-Stiglitz  measures  to 
them. 
It is hard to find some criterion by which one might choose  because 
greater stability is not related to anything  like the welfare of consum- 
ers or any other  economically  meaningful  quantity.  We can think of 
circumstances  in which each of these  measures  would  be appropriate 
and others  in which each would  be inappropriate,  at least intuitively. 
(The example  of Sec. II, it should  be noted,  gives greater instability in 
both the distribution  of prices and the distribution  of price changes.) 
And,  in any event,  even  when  4,  =  Ot and  the  0, are i.i.d.,  it seems 
unlikely  that any stronger  results can be obtained. 
One  problem  is the  following:  Consider  what  happens  if some  of 
the  good  put  into  storage  is  lost  to  wastage.  In  this  case,  average 
consumption  with speculation  will be less than average  consumption 
without, so one expects  average prices to rise. This is rigorously true if 
D(p; 0)  =  K(0)  -  Ap for  constant  A  >  0  in  the  relevant  range  of 
prices. How does  a rise in average  price square with greater stability? 
If, moreover,  demand  at 0 is (nearly) perfectly elastic (and the storage 
capacity of speculators  is insufficient  to absorb X), then correcting  for 
any such  shift  in  mean  will give  a (corrected)  distribution  of  prices 
under  speculation  that  falls below  the  distribution  of  prices  for  the 
economy  with  no  speculation.7  What about  the  distribution  of  price 
changes?  We will not give details but simply assert that examples  can 
be constructed  that show that the answer here is ambiguous  as well. If 
a stronger  statement  than the proposition  is possible, we do not know 
what it is. 
Since  it  is  hard  to  strengthen  the  notion of  stabilization,  we  now 
consider  whether  instead  it is possible to relax the conditions  required 
7 Wright and Williams (1982)  note the difficulty of determining  whether  speculation 
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for stabilization. In the example  of Section II, the sequence  {0,} is i.i.d. 
Hence  this alone  is insufficient  for the weak result in proposition  3 if 
agents  are  able  to  foresee  something  of  the  future.  It  is  also  in- 
sufficient  to assume  that at  =  Ot but relax the assumption  that {0,} is 
i.i.d. This is immediate  from the example  of Section II as well: we can 
simply redefine  0, so there  are four  possible  values corresponding  to 
the four  states in the  Markov chain. 
One  might  imagine  that what causes the problem  in the example  is 
the imperfect  nature of the signal g,.  Suppose,  for example,  that {0t} is 
i.i.d. and that any foreseeing  that takes place is flawless:  ,t =  (0t, 0,+ 1, 
*  * *,  0+k)  for some  k. Will this suffice  to obtain a result analogous  to 
proposition  3? 
The  answer  is no,  for  any  finite  k. Fixing  k, we  can  construct  an 
example  in which the  lowest  price with speculation  is lower than the 
lowest without.  Let us sketch the example  for k =1  to give the basic 
idea. 
Imagine  that  Ot can  take on  any of  three  values,  0, 00, or 0. Con- 
sumption  demand  schedules  are  as illustrated  in figure  1. Suppose 
p 
D(  ;8) 
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that  6 has  very  high  probability  and  that D(-; 0) is sufficiently  high 
that, whenever  it is known that 0+  1 will equal 0, speculators  buy up to 
their capacity (less than X). Moreover,  the chance  that Ot+2  =  0 is so 
high that, when  8,+  I=  and 8, =  0, the anticipation  of this (and the 
concomitant  rise in Pt  + I) causes speculators  to buy up to their capacity. 
But when Ot+  I =  8, the elasticity of D(-; 0) implies that in period  t +  1 
prices will not rise above p'(0); hence  under  no circumstances  would 
speculators  store  at date  t. 
Start the economy  with 81 =  0 and Ot+  I =  00. Speculators then store, 
anticipating  that, with high  probability,  01+2  will equal 0 and Pt+  I will 
rise, given the further  rise anticipated  at date t +  2. But then suppose 
Ot+2  turns  out  to be 8. Speculators  will dump  their stores,  and-the 
way we have drawn D(';  00)-this  will take Pt+  I below p'(0). Note  that 
prices will never  fall below p'(0) when  Ot  =  0, but they will sometimes 
do so when  8t =  0,.  That  is, the lowest observed  price will not corre- 
spond  to the  lowest  0. 
This covers the case k =  1. For any finite k, a similar example  can be 
constructed  by  having  the  consumption  demand  curves  ever  more 
wild in behavior.  On the other  hand,  if we fix an economy  except  for 
the specification  of k (i.e.,  fix D, D',  0,  and G) and then lengthen  the 
foresightedness  of agents  by increasing  k, eventually we get an asymp- 
totic result  analogous  to proposition  3.  Indeed,  for cases of  very far 
foresightedness,  we need  not assume  that the 8, are i.i.d. 
While  the  general  proof  (and  even  the  statement  of  the  result)  is 
quite  involved,  there  is  a  simple  limiting  case,  that  of  perfect 
foresight:  At date t agents know all future values of 0t+k.  (This violates 
our assumption  of  finite 4;  however,  no  technical  problems  arise.) 
PROPOSITION  4. In the case of  perfect  foresight  (starting with Xo= 
X), equilibrium  prices  never  drop  below pc(0). 
The  proof  is simple.  Fix any sequence  {80}, and let p(, p  be the 
(deterministic)  sequence  of equilibrium  prices.  Suppose  (inductively) 
that Pt ?  pc(8).  Either Pt  + I  P  pt or  Pt+ I < Pt.  In the former case, Pt  ?  I 
pc(_). And in the latter case, speculative  demand  is zero so that Pt+ 1 
pc(8t+  I)  ?  p"(0).  Since PO  -  pc(O), the  result follows  by induction. 
More generally,  we have  the  following  result. 
PROPOSITION  5. Fix the following  pieces of a model: 0,  D, D',  and G. 
For every  E >  0 there  exists an N such that for all models  in which 4b 
reveals (at least)  (0t, Ot+ l,  .  .  ,  Ot+N),  the  lowest  price ever achieved, 
starting with X(0)  =  X, is greater  than or equal  to pc(8)  -  E. 
The  proof  is only  sketched  here.  (A  complete  proof  is available 
from  the authors  on  request.)  Given our  assumptions,  one  can show 
that for every 8 >  0 there is a sufficiently  large N (depending  on 0,  D, 
Di,  and G) that, if agents can foresee  at least N periods,  the support of 
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sees  further  and  further  into  the  future,  surprises  about  that future 
have less and less effect  on next  period's prices. Now  for every E >  0, 
there  is a  P >  0  such  that  prices  can  be  depressed  to  a level  at or 
below  1(0)-  E only  if supplies  carried  forward  by speculators  are at 
least P3.  And for each ,3>  0 there  is a "rate of interest" L  >  0 such that 
speculators  will not carry forward P3  unless there is positive probability 
that prices will rise by at least L. If we take 8 to be  [p'(0)  -  E]/2 and N 
sufficiently  large,  this  means  that  prices  can  be  depressed  to  below 
pC(0)  -  E from  above  this level only if they are certain to be no lower 
than p'(0)  -  E, which establishes p'(0)  -  E as a lower bound  if we start 
above  this level. 
VI.  Concluding  Remarks 
It  is sometimes  argued  that  speculation  has  the  following  desirable 
features.  First, by buying  cheap  and selling  dear, speculators  stabilize 
prices. Second,  by looking  into  the future  and anticipating  economic 
trends,  speculators  smooth  the  transition  of  the  economy  from  one 
long-run  equilibrium  to another.  We have shown,  using a very simple 
model  in which speculation  is synonymous  with storage,  that specula- 
tion  may  possess  neither  of  these  features.  In  particular,  we  have 
presented  examples  in which,  in spite of the fact that nonspeculators 
and  speculators  alike behave  rationally  and speculators  are competi- 
tive,  speculation  destabilizes  prices  (in any  meaningful  sense  of  the 
word).  Moreover,  this  is  not  because  of  a  lack  of  foresight  by 
speculators:  in fact,  making  speculators  more  foresighted  may actu- 
ally worsen  the  problem. 
As we have  emphasized,  the  conclusion  is that speculative  activity 
may destabilize  prices,  not  that  it  will.  In  fact,  we  have  presented 
sufficient  conditions  for speculation  to be stabilizing  (albeit in a very 
weak sense).  These  are  that consumption  demand  is independently 
and  identically  distributed  over  time  and  that  speculators  have  no 
foresight  about future  demand  at all, or that speculators  have a great 
deal  of  foresight.  The  extreme  restrictiveness  of  these  conditions  is 
striking, as is the very weak criterion of stabilization that we can show. 
And  it  is not  lack  of  effort  (at least)  that  causes  us  to  report  such 
meager  positive  results. 
Indeed,  while  we  do  not  believe  that  speculative  activity  has  no 
stabilizing  effect  at  all,  we  do  find  appealing  the  sort  of  short-run 
decrease  in  stability that  permeates  our  basic example.  Speculators 
will buy or sell according  to increases  and decreases  in the probability 
of large-scale changes.  They  may withdraw supplies  from the market, 
and  then,  when  the  danger  recedes,  they  may dump  those  supplies 
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transitions when  they  happen,  it can (and, we believe,  does)  do so at 
the cost of more small-scale fluctuations  for which a tangible cause will 
only very rarely be identifiable. 
In order  to proceed  with our analysis, we have made  a number  of 
simplifying  assumptions.  One of the most serious of these is the omis- 
sion of production.  It is not clear, however,  that including  production 
would  change  our  conclusions  all that  much.  One  must take care in 
distinguishing  between  instantaneous  production  and  production 
with a lag. If production  is instantaneous,  then it can be absorbed into 
nonspeculative  demand,  and  our  analysis  is  unaltered.  Production 
with a lag raises new issues. Production  with a lag (of, say, one period) 
is similar to storage  in some  respects, but there is an important differ- 
ence: Storage responds  (generally)  to increased  chances for spot price 
appreciation  since  the  opportunity  cost  of  storage  is  forgone  con- 
sumption  today of the good  in question.  Insofar  as production  has as 
opportunity  cost  forgone  consumption  of  other  goods,  it  responds 
more  to increased  chances  of  high  (absolute)  prices tomorrow.  This 
can  have  counterintuitive  effects  (see,  e.g.,  Scheinkman  and 
Schechtman  1983).  Still, the  sort of  example  we  have  given  for  de- 
stabilizing storage  is easily modified  to give an example  of destabiliz- 
ing  production.  At the  same  time,  with lagged  production,  specula- 
tion  may  yield  an  important  additional  benefit  of  conveying 
information.  Suppose,  for example,  that speculators  (correctly) antici- 
pate a future  increase  in demand  for a commodity.  This will increase 
current  storage  demand  and  hence  lead  to a current  price rise. Pro- 
ducers, observing  this price rise, will, given rational expectations,  de- 
duce that future demand  is likely to be high and will be encouraged  to 
invest in the future  production  of the commodity.  As a result,  future 
prices  will be lower  than  otherwise  (since  supplies  are greater),  and 
the price path may be stabilized  relative to a situation  of no specula- 
tion. (This,  of course,  is subject to exactly the sorts of caveats around 
which this paper has been  written.)  Thus  the inclusion  of production 
may  strengthen  the  case  that  (foresighted)  speculative  activity  is 
stabilizing,  at least insofar  as it gives  to  producers  information  that 
they would  otherwise  not collect. 
Finally,  we  should  emphasize  that  (as  already  noted  in  the  In- 
troduction),  while we have studied  the effect  of speculation  on prices, 
the more interesting  economic  question  concerns  the effect  of specu- 
lation  on  welfare.  Conditions  are  known  under  which  competitive 
speculation  leads  to  a first-best  in  terms  of  total  welfare  (see,  e.g., 
Samuelson  1971;  Scheinkman  and  Schechtman  1983).  This  is so re- 
gardless  of  whether  speculation  stabilizes  or destabilizes  prices.  But 
these  conditions  involve  risk neutrality,  and  they are results for total 
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averse  producers,  "destabilizing" speculation  can lead  to  an ex  ante 
Pareto  decrease  in  utility.  Examples  in  the  spirit  of  Newbery  and 
Stiglitz (1984)  can obtain the same result for "stabilizing" speculation. 
And  if one  looks  at one  sector  only  and  not  at overall  welfare,  then 
even  assuming  risk neutrality  is of  little help.  In our  basic example, 
consumers  are better  off  for  having  prices destabilized;  and  it is not 
hard  to  put  together  examples  in which  risk-neutral  consumers  are 
worse off  with (stabilizing) speculation.  We have shown here  that it is 
hard to say much about the effects  of speculation  on price stability. It 




Recall that p solves D(j, 6) =  X. Let t  be the solution to D(L, 0)  =  X. By 
assumption 2, there exists a constant y such that, for each 6, D(,; 0) is y- 
Lipschitzian  over the range [p,  p] and P(-; 0) is -y-Lipschitzian  over the range 
XI-  (Take y to be a uniform upper bound on the first derivatives  of the 
functions over these compact intervals.) 
LEMMA  Al.  Suppose that q: (D x  [X, X] -*  [0, mo)  is continuous  and nonin- 
creasing in its second argument and that q c  p. Then there exists a unique 
function Tq:  4) x  [X,  X] --  [0, ??)  that solves 
D(Tq(40,  X); 0) +  D&(Tq(4),  X); F(4),  G(X -  D(Tq(4),  X); 0)), q)) =  X.  (Al) 
Moreover, this function Tq is strictly decreasing and 2y-Lipschitzian  in its 
second argument and satisfies  t  c  Tq c  p. 
The  operator T defined by (Al)  has a simple interpretation: If prices 
next period are given by q and if speculators  this period understand  that this 
is so, then prices this period are given by Tq. 
Proof. Refer to figure Al.  Fixing 4)  =  (0, t)  and X, we graph D(p; 0) and 
D(p; 0) + D'(p; F(4),  G(X -  D(p; 0)), q)). Of course, D(p; 0) is continuous and 
strictly decreasing in p. And D'(p; F(4), G(X -  D(p; 6)), q)) is continuous 
and nonincreasing  in p. To see that D' is nonincreasing,  note that increasing 
p raises the first argument and lowers (stochastically)  the second. As for con- 
tinuity,  apply  assumptions  3, 4, and 9, noting that  q is, by assumption,  bounded 
above. For  p ?t p, D  (p; 6) and, hence, D + D' exceed X. For  p ?  p, D(p;  6) <  X 
while  D' = 0 (since  s  p), so D + D' s  X. Thus figure Al is appropriate,  and 
(for each X E [X, X]) there exists a unique Tq(4),  X) that solves equation (Al) 
and that lies between p and p. 
Refer now to figure&A2.  Fixing 4 =  (6, t), when we raise X to the level X', 
the level of D' falls for each p because  X -  D(p;  0) and, hence, G(X -  D(P;  0)) 
both increase, which causes the distribution of  future prices to fall. It is 
immediately clear that Tq(4),  X') <  Tq(4),  X); Tq is strictly  decreasing in its 
second argument. (The strictness comes from the strict decrease in D.) To 
measure how much Tq decreases, we will estimate first p0 -  Tq(40,  X') and 
then Tq(4),  X) -  po, where p0 is (as shown) the solution of 
D(p; 0) +  D'(p; F(4),  G(X' -  D(p; 0)), q)) = X. PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  949 
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Tq (#,  x) 
FIG. Al 
Estimating p0 -  Tq(4., X') is easy; the fact that D  +  D' is more steeply sloped 
than is D together  with our upper  bound  on the slope of the inverse demand 
function  P imply that p0 -  Tq(4, X') s  y(X'  -  X). As for Tq(4.,  X)  -  p0, note 
that, if p' and p" are such that D(p'; 0)  -  D(p"; 0) ?  X'  -  X, then X -  D(p";  0) 
>2  -  X  D(p';  0), and hence  q(+t+ 1, G(X -  D(p";  0)))s  q(4+t?  1, G(X' -  D(p'; 0))) 
for each 4t+  1. Since D';  0)  -  D(p"; 0) ?  X'  -X  > 0 can hold only when p' < 
p", this condition  implies  that 
D(p'; 0)  +  D'(p'; F(+,  G(X'  -D(p';  0)), q)) >  D(p"; 0) 
+  D'(p"; F(4,  G(X-  D  ";  0)), q)). 
D + D'('  x'.) 
-  D +  D'(  x) 
Tq  +x')  p?  Tq(4,x) 
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Letting p0  play the role of p' and  Tq(4, X) the role of p', the definition  of p0 
implies that D(p0;  0) -  D(Tq(4#,  X); 0) < X'  -  X.  Thus by our bound on the 
slope of the inverse demand function, p0  -  Tq(4.,  X) ?  y(X'  -  X). 
With these two estimates, the proof of the lemma is complete. 
The  last part of  this argument is a bit hard to read through, so let us 
rephrase it. (The reason we need this last part of the argument will become 
apparent  shortly.)  We want to know how much equilibrium  prices will  change 
as we move from supply level X to a (higher) level X'. We take the change in 
two pieces. First (and this corresponds to the second estimate above) imagine 
that the "extra"  X'  -  X is put into storage for a period-without  trying to 
account for who is doing so. At the equilibrium price for X, speculators  will 
react to this by lessening their demand since the extra will depress next 
period's price. But then equilibrium price this period will fall. The estimate 
simply  says that the fall in equilibrium  price cannot be more than the amount 
that causes consumers to absorb the extra since when that happens total 
storage will be back to its original level and speculative demand will be re- 
stored to its original level (or, owing to the lower current price, more). Sec- 
ond, prices must fall so that someone is really absorbing  the extra units. But 
again the price decline cannot be more than it would take to put these units in 
the hands of consumers since speculative  demand will  only rise. Since we have 
(by assumption) put a uniform upper bound on the elasticity  of demand of 
consumers, we get the estimates given above. 
LEMMA  A2. Let q and q' be two functions  from 4) x  [X,  XA]  -*  [0,  o.)  that are 
both continuous and nonincreasing  in their second arguments  and that satisfy 
q c  q' c  p. Then  Tq ?  Tq'- 
Proof. Fixing  4+ =  (0, i)  and X, q c  q' implies  that, for each p, 
D'(p; F(4,  G(X -  D(p; 0)), q)) ?  D'(p; F(4,  G(X -  D(p; 0)), q')). 
Thus  moving  from q to q' in figure Al  amounts  to a shift outward of the D  + 
D' schedule  and,  hence,  an increase  (weakly) in Tq(4, X). 
Proof of Proposition 1. We can now proceed  to prove proposition  1. Define p0 
--0,  and let pI  =  Tp0, p2 =  Tp', and  so on.  (The  interpretation  is that pn  is 
the equilibrium  price  if speculators  will disappear  in n periods.)  Lemma  Al 
ensures  that each  step  of  the  construction  is feasible,  that each  pn  is strictly 
decreasing  and  2-y-Lipschitzian (hence  continuous)  in its second  argument, 
and that p  c  pn  C  p  for each n. Lemma  A2 ensures  that p  +I  ?1 pn. Thus  the 
limit  function  p*  =  lim,.pn  is  well  defined,  it  is  nonincreasing  and  2-y- 
Lipschitzian,  and  it satisfies p  c  p* c  p. (Note  that here  is where  we use the 
Lipschitzian property:  simple continuity  of the pn would not necessarily imply 
continuity  of p*.) 
Because p* and the pn are all equi-Lipschitzian,  we can "pass to the limit" in 
(Al),  showing  that Tp* =  p* and (hence)  that p* is an equilibrium.  Precisely, 
for  every  X and  4. =  (0, t),  the  continuity  of  G and D  implies  that  G(X  - 
D(p((4,  X); 0)) approaches  G(X -  D(p*(4., X); 0)). And thus the equicontinuity 
of p* and  the ph implies  that,  for  each  4dt+  i,  pn((4t?  G(X -  D(pn(4., X); 0))) 
approaches p*(4.t+ 1, G(X -  D(p*(4., X); 0))). The  assumed  continuity of the D' 
function  then  gives  the  desired  result. 
Application  of  lemma  Al  once  more  implies  that p* (now shown  equal  to 
Tp* for a nonincreasing  p*) is strictly decreasing.  To  show that X  -D(p*(, 
X); 0) is increasing  in X, suppose  that X >  X' but X  -  D(p*(4., X); 0) <  XA'  - 
D(p*(4., X'); 0). Storage  is less this period  under  X than A', so next  period's 
prices will be no smaller under  X. And current  price is lower under X. Hence PRICE  DESTABILIZING  SPECULATION  951 
speculative  demand can be no lower under X, contradicting  the supposition 
that it is strictly  lower. 
It remains to show that this equilibrium  is unique. The first step is to show 
that equilibrium  prices are bounded above. Since supply is never less than X, 
we can apply assumption  6 to get this trivially:  Pick  p large enough that  D(p;  0) 
< X12  and that D'(p; .) < X12.  Clearly,  no equilibrium  price could ever exceed 
this p. 
Next, we argue that, if j  is any other equilibrium,  then p ?  p*. To see this, 
we must strengthen lemma A2 to read: If q and q' are functions such that (i) q 
is continuous and nonincreasing in its second argument and is less than or 
equal to t, (ii) q' is such that there is some solution Tq'  of (A2), and (iii)  q <  qua 
then Tq ?  Tq' (for the  unique solution Tq and any solution Tq'). This 
strengthening  is easy:  simply  review  the  argument  given  and/or  draw  the 
appropriate picture.  With this  result,  proceed  as  follows: Since  prices 
are nonnegative,  ?  p0. Applying the result inductively  yields Tp =  p >  Tpn 
pn +I  for all n, and  (hence)  p  ?  p*. 
Finally,  suppose that we knew that there was some (40, X0)  that achieved  the 
maximum  value in f(4,  X)lp*(4,  X). Then the distribution  of "rates  of return" 
under p starting  from (4?0,  X0)  will be no larger (stochastically)  than the distri- 
bution of rates of return under p* at the same point. Then assumption 7 
implies that speculative  demand under p can be no larger at this point than it 
is under P*. And, since  p :  t*, consumption  demand can be no higher. Thus 
to  satisfy market  clearing,  p(40,  X0)  =  p*(40,  X0) (or else  there  would  be a 
shortfall in consumption demand). Since (40, X0) is presumed to maximize 
the ratio iip*, this implies that jp'p*. 
This argument is not quite complete since it assumes  that there is some (+? 
XO)  that attains  the maximum  in the ratios.  As the domain of possible  (4k,  X) is 
compact,  if we knew that  p was continuous, we would be done. But even if  # is 
not necessarily  continuous, the argument goes through with a bit of care: 
Look along a sequence of (4, X) that attains (in the limit) the supremum of 
p(4, X)lp*(4,  X). Picking  a subsequence  if necessary,  we can assume that p(4', 
G(X -  D(p(4, X); 0))) converges along this sequence for every 4'. Now apply 
the argument above to show that, for this limit distribution  of next period's 
prices, there will be a nonvanishing shortfall in demand as long as the su- 
premum  of  p(40, X)Ip*(4,, X) is strictly greater  than  one.  Applying  the  con- 
tinuity of D and D' near this limit completes the argument. 
In our definition of equilibrium,  we specifically  assume time homogeneity. 
It is worth noting that time-inhomogeneous equilibria are ruled out by an 
argument  similar  to the one just given. The key is that, because  of assumption 
6, equilibrium  prices must be uniformly bounded. So one would look for a 
triple  (t, X, X) that  achieves  close  to the  supremum  of pft(4, X)Ip*(4,, X) and 
then proceed as above. 
Proof  of Proposition  2. We have already shown that  p* c p. Suppose that for 
some t  we had p*((6, I), X) < p.  Then consumption demand at this price 
would exceed X, a contradiction. 
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